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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the ability of the 
discounting models of causal schemata (Kelley, 1972), 
multiple discrete causes (Shaver, 1981) and minimum 
causation (Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982) to predict probability 
and strength attributions for causes and events.
Discounting refers to reductions in the perceived strength, 
probability, or importance of causal factors that occur when 
more than one causal factor is assumed present. According 
to Kelley's model, the role of each potential causes is 
considered independently, leading to a linear pattern of 
discounting. Hypothesizing that combinations of causes are 
evaluated in addition to individual causes, Shaver's 
multiple discrete cause model proposes a nonlinear pattern 
of discounting. In contrast, Shaklee and Fischhoff's 
minimum causation model predicts complete discounting of 
additional causes once a single cause is found to be 
sufficient for an event to occur. Transitivity of 
discounting, or the extent to which judgments regarding the 
presence or absence of possible causes of a given event were 
similar to judgments regarding the presence or absence of 
events given a particular set of causes, also was examined. 
Finally, this study compared discounting for legal and 
interpersonal situations.
Sixty-five male and 84 female undergraduates were presented 
with 6 legal and 6 interpersonal situations, 2 of each 
associated with 1, 2, and 3 causes. In the events-given 
condition, subjects were asked to judge the probability and 
strength of each of the one, two, or three causes presented. 
In the causes-given condition, subjects were asked to judge 
the probability and strength of a potential event.
The results of this study suggest that both the minimum 
causation model and the causal schema model predict 
discounting in various situations. Little evidence was 
found to support the multiple discrete cause model. 
Nontransitivity of discounting and the absence of a single 
pattern of discounting across situations suggest that no 
single attribution model can account satisfactorily for the 
wide variety of situations confronted by individuals.
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TRANSITIVITY OF PROBABILITY AND STRENGTH 
A TEST OF THREE DISCOUNTING MODELS
2Introduction
The study of causal attribution is fundamentally 
important to the understanding of both interpersonal and 
intrapersonal behaviors. Variations in causal ascription 
have been found to affect a wide variety of phenomena 
including cancer mortality (Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984), 
prejudice (Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979), and level of 
depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). In the 
legal system, assignment of causality takes on societal 
importance, determining guilt or innocence, and consequently 
whether an individual faces incarceration or freedom.
Whether the event in question is a failed relationship, an 
automobile accident, or a gruesome murder, the goals behind 
attributional judgments remain the same: to provide an 
understanding of the situation and a feeling of control over 
future events.
Among attribution theories, Kelley's models of 
covariation and causal schemata (1967, 1972, 1973) perhaps 
are the most influential descriptions of the processes by 
which actor and environmental causal forces are 
distinguished. According to Kelley's principle of 
covariation, perceivers provided several opportunities to 
study a situation use distinctiveness, consistency and 
consensus information to attribute the event to the cause 
"with which, over time, it covaries" (Kelley, 1973, p. 108). 
If a particular event occurs only in the presence of a
3particular entity and does not occur in the presence of 
other entities, distinctiveness is considered high with 
respect to that entity. Consistency refers to the extent to 
which an event occurs each time a particular entity and a 
particular actor are present together. Consensus 
information provides attributional clues by addressing 
whether or not people other than the perceiver experience 
the same effect when in the presence of the same entity. 
Different combinations of high and low distinctiveness, 
consistency, and consensus information lead to attributions 
to either the actor, the situation, or the entity.
According to Kelly, an event with low consensus, low 
distinctiveness, and high consistency would lead to a trait 
attribution. In contrast, this model suggests that an event 
marked by high distinctiveness, low consistency, and low 
consensus would lead to a situation attribution. Using an 
experimental paradigm in which subjects receive ambiguous 
information contrasting the reaction of the actor with the 
reaction of other actors (consensus), an actor's response to 
an entity with his or her response to other entities 
(distinctiveness) and the consistency of the interaction of 
the actor and the entity with interactions with other actors 
and other entities (consistency), past research (Major,
1980; McArthur, 1972) suggests that people attend to each of 
the three types of covariation information, relying most 
heavily on consistency information and least heavily on
4consensus information. Although not yet subjected to 
adequate empirical test, the PEAT model recently proposed by 
Medcof (1990) suggests the need for an experimental paradigm 
that provides less ambiguous comparisons of the probability 
of an event in the presence and absence of particular 
actors, entities, and the combinations of specific actors 
and entities. According to Medcof, more precise probability 
information would allow subjects to contrast probabilities 
across the three domains of actors, entities, and 
actor/entity combinations as well as within the three 
domains. Medcof argues that the ambiguous information 
presented in past research does not allow subjects to make 
comparisons across domains, and thus provides an opportunity 
to examine only a small proportion of possible combinations 
of high and low consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness 
information (Medcof, 1990).
When repeated observations are not possible and causal 
information is limited, Kelley suggests that causal schemata 
are used to conduct attributional searches. These causal 
schemata are abstract conceptions of the interactions among 
potential causes that provide a framework for the inference 
of cause-effect relationships in ambiguous situations. 
According to Kelley, schemata facilitate causal analysis, 
but are not as accurate as more complete techniques, 
permitting only "reasonably good" causal inferences to be 
drawn (Kelley, 1972, p. 152).
5Two main categories of schemata, multiple necessary 
causal schema (MNC) and multiple sufficient causal schema 
(MSC) are proposed in Kelley's schema model. The MSC schema 
model describes situations in which, although several 
factors could produce an event, only one needs to be present 
for the effect to occur. In contrast, the MNC schema model 
assumes that the presence of each of two or more causes is 
necessary for the production of an event. In the presence 
of only one of the necessary causes, the event will not 
occur. Using variations of these two "thought models", 
Kelley proposes that the lay attributor has a wide 
"repertoire of causal schemata" (p. 118, 1973).
Some of the schemata variations Kelley describes (1972) 
assume that the attributor is able to distinguish not only 
between the presence or absence of causes and effects, but 
also among degrees of causation, or variations in causal 
strength. In contrast to this view, Shaver's (1981) model 
of multiple discrete causes asserts that individuals do not 
recognize degrees of causation. Whether people do or do not 
believe that causes can vary in strength is an important 
question to explore in order to understand the process by 
which people make attributions in multiple cause situations. 
Although these two models make different predictions 
regarding how people evaluate each cause as the number of 
causes increases, the models have not been compared
6empirically. In the following sections, these two models 
will be discussed and their opposing hypotheses outlined. 
Kellev's Causal Schema Model
According to Kelley's causal schema model (1972), both 
causes and effects can be perceived as either discrete or 
quantitatively graded in strength. When a cause is 
discrete, the effect occurs in the presence of the cause and 
does not occur in its absence. In contrast, an effect may 
not result even in the presence of a cause if the cause is 
of insufficient strength to produce an effect by itself and 
it is not combined with a second causal force. A gunshot 
wound to the heart is a discrete cause because its mere 
presence leads to the death of the victim. In contrast, 
because studying does not lead always to the desired effect 
of a passing grade, an activity such as studying for an exam 
could be conceptualized as a graded cause. In some 
situations, the causal force of studying may be present 
without bringing about the desired effect of a passing grade 
if the studying is not of sufficient "strength", or if the 
ease of the exam does not combine with a lesser amount of 
studying to produce a passing grade.
Use of graded causes is assumed in Kelley's 
compensatory schema, a variation of the MSC schema (1972).
It is thought that people use the compensatory schema to 
evaluate cause-event relationships when the event could be 
produced by any one of several potential causes if the one
7cause is of sufficient strength, or when the event could be 
produced if several causes of lesser strength are combined. 
The compensatory schema model proposes that each of the 
quantitatively graded causes is ranked on the schema 
structure according to increasing strength. Consider the 
schema for an event with two quantitatively graded causes 
diagrammed in Figure 1. On the vertical side, Cause 1 is 
nonexistent in the left upper corner and is of greatest 
strength in the left lower corner. On the horizontal axis, 
Cause 2 is absent in the left corner and is strongest in the 
right corner. In this example, the effect is present when 
either Cause 1 or Cause 2 is present and is of high 
strength, or when both are present and at least one is of 
moderate strength. When both causes are of low strength, or 
only one cause is present and is of low or moderate 
strength, the effect does not occur.
Given information regarding the presence or absence of 
an effect, use of this schema allows inferences to be drawn 
regarding the presence and strength of these two causes. 
Conversely, if the perceiver knows whether or not the 
various causal forces are present, he or she can make 
inferences regarding the presence and strength of the 
effect. Referring back to the studying example, the 
compensatory schema would predict that either moderate 
studying or a moderately easy exam would lead to a passing 
grade. The magnitude of the passing grade could range from
8a grade of "D" to a grade of "A+" depending on the 
particular combination of studying effort and exam 
difficulty. Thus, this model assumes that people can 
distinguish between degrees of effects as well as between 
degrees of causal strength.
When more than one causal force is involved in an 
event, Kelley proposes two rules by which a person can make 
causal inferences. These rules of augmentation and 
discounting require that people consider causes to be either 
facilitative or inhibitory. A facilitative cause is a cause 
that increases the likelihood of an event, whereas an 
inhibitory cause reduces the likelihood that an event will 
occur. If an event occurs despite the presence of an 
inhibitory cause, Kelley states that perceivers employ the 
augmentat ion principle (1972). Perceiving an event to occur 
in the presence of an inhibitory cause, the attributor 
infers that a facilitative cause must also be present and 
must be of adequate strength to overcome the effects of the 
inhibitory cause. Consequently, the strength of this 
facilitative cause is perceived to be greater than it would 
have been to produce the event in the absence of the 
inhibitory cause.
In the presence of more than one facilitative cause, 
Kelley predicts that discounting will occur. The 
discounting principle states that "the role of a given cause 
in producing a given effect is discounted if other plausible
9causes are also present.” (Kelley, 1973, p. 113). According 
to this principle, when told of an event of constant 
magnitude and the presence of two or more causes, an 
attributor will reduce the perceived strength of each cause 
in order that the combined strength of the causes is equal 
to the strength of the effect. Reduction in strength is 
assumed to proceed in a linear function with the addition of 
each new causal element. If the effect varies in strength 
as causes are added, Kelley proposes an additive effects 
schema, such that as one or both causes increase in 
strength, the strength of the resulting effect increases as 
well. When both the effect and one cause of sufficient 
strength to produce the effect are known to be present, the 
discounting principle suggests that predictions regarding 
the presence of additional causes will be marked with 
ambiguity.
Judgments regarding discounting, as well as cause- 
effect relationships in general, assume that individuals are 
capable of probabilistic judgments. Although probability 
judgments have been found to be biased by cognitive 
heuristics such as salience (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), 
availability and representativeness (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973; 1974), it is appropriate for several reasons to 
discuss probability estimates in the context of attribution 
judgments. First, by their very nature, attributional 
judgments require perceivers to make judgments regarding
causes they think are most likely to be responsible for an 
effect. Second, these probability judgments generally 
involve relative ratings of probability rather than precise 
judgments. Thus, what is important in reference to 
discounting is whether or not attributors assume that the 
likelihood that any particular cause was responsible for an 
effect is reduced as new causes become evident, not the 
actual probability rating assigned to any one particular 
cause. Furthermore, past research (e.g. Cheng & Novick, 
1990; Dunning, & Parpal, 1989; Leddo, Abelson, & Gross,
1984) indicates that subjects are able to evaluate the 
probabilistic connection between various causes and 
particular events. According to Medcof (1990), if 
attributional theory is to move toward maturity, research 
will need to use paradigms that address the probabilistic 
nature of judgments less ambiguously than frequently done in 
the past (e.g. Major, 1980; McArthur, 1972).
Shaver's Multiple Discrete Cause Model
In contrast to Kelley's model employing continuously 
graded causes, Shaver's multiple discrete model (1981) 
recognizes only discrete causes. Invoking the Aristotelian 
philosophical tradition, Shaver claims that quantitatively 
graded causes present conceptual and logical problems. 
Defining a cause as discrete, or ”a thing or event that by 
its mere presence, produces an effect,” (Shaver, 1981, p. 
353) Shaver disagrees with Kelley's view that a cause may be
11
present, but of insufficient strength to produce an effect. 
By adding conditions of strength to the requirement of 
presence, Shaver argues that graded effects "destroy[s] the 
category assignment rule inherent in the definition" (1981, 
p. 353) of a cause. To avoid the inconsistency inherent in 
defining causes as both graded and discrete, Shaver proposes 
the adoption of a multiple discrete cause approach.
According to Shaver, the defining characteristic of a 
cause is that it contributes to the production of an effect. 
Using this definition, any force that is present but does 
not produce an effect is not a cause. This multiple 
discrete cause model states that changes in an effect are 
not produced by a change in the strength of a cause, but 
rather changes in the number or nature of other causal 
elements. Furthermore, this model states that causal 
elements of different "magnitude" are qualitatively 
different, not simply variations of a single cause. Thus, 
"to study" and "to study hard" are two discrete causes, not 
a variation of a single cause. The absence of these would 
be "not to study" or "not to study hard," rather than "not 
to study hard enough," which implies continuous degrees of 
effort.
Although he does not outline the proposal in detail, 
Shaver suggests that this approach logically would extend to 
the concept of discrete, rather than graded, effects as 
well. According to this approach, the effects produced by
12
greater numbers of causal elements would not differ in 
magnitude, but rather in kind. Thus, to receive a "D" on an 
exam, and to receive an ,,A+" on the same exam are not two 
points on a continuum, but are two distinct events.
The multiple discrete cause approach focuses its 
criticism of Kelley's causal schema model on the 
compensatory causal schema. Arguing that the definition of 
a cause as an inhibitory force contradicts the definition of 
a cause as that which contributes to the production of an 
outcome, Shaver recommends that this term be replaced by the 
term obstacle. Shaver also argues that to label a cause as 
facilitative is repetitive and confusing. Thus, according 
to Shaver, a facilitative force should be referred to simply 
as a cause.
The multiple discrete cause model does not rule out the 
possibility that more than one cause may be involved in the 
production of an effect. In Shaver's model, the concept of 
graded causes is replaced with the concepts of minimally 
sufficient causal subsets and redundant causal subsets. A 
minimally sufficient subset is any set of causes that is 
capable of creating an effect only if all the elements of 
the set are present. Within each minimally sufficient 
causal subset, each causal element is discrete and 
nonredundant in that each causal element is necessary for 
the occurrence of the effect.
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Because many events can happen in a variety of ways, 
the attributor is often faced with the task of assessing 
redundant subsets. These redundant subsets consist of 
elements contained in multiple subsets. In the case of the 
effect with two possible causes portrayed in Figure 1, the 
causal combination of Cause 1: High Strength + Cause 2: Low 
Strength, and the causal subset of Cause 1: High Strength 
are redundant causal subsets because they both contain Cause 
1: High Strength.
Like Kelley's model, Shaver's model predicts that the 
role of each cause will be discounted as the number of 
causes increases. The two models differ, however, on the 
actual form this discounting would take. Whereas Kelley's 
theory states that discounting should proceed in a linear 
fashion as a function of the actual number of causes 
considered, Shaver states that discounting should increase 
in a nonlinear fashion as a function of the number of 
combinations of redundant and nonredundant causal elements.
Shaver (1981) outlines several advantages his model 
provides over Kelley's model. First, this model avoids the 
definitional confusion inherent in identifying causes 
sometimes by their mere presence, and distinguishing between 
causes of differing strength at other times. Second, the 
multiple discrete cause approach restates both discounting 
and augmentation principles in clear presence-absence terms. 
Finally, because intent can be more clearly discerned in
14
qualitatively different events than events that differ only 
in magnitude, Shaver argues that his model's fine-grained 
analysis of events is more closely aligned with recent 
advances proposed by reasons-explanation philosophers to 
explain human action in terms of intentionality.
Despite the clear advantages Shaver's model offers, the 
extent to which his model captures the attributional process 
is unclear. Although it is logical to discuss causes and 
events in terms of presence or absence rather than in terms 
of amounts of presence or absence, it is important to know 
how the naive perceiver use these concepts. Because one of 
the main purposes of the theory of attribution is to 
determine how causality is assigned in everyday situations, 
it seems logical that the definitions of fundamental 
concepts should reflect common usage.
Although results from numerous studies suggest that 
attributors discount the importance of multiple causal 
elements in some fashion, a direct comparison of Kelley's 
linear model with Shaver's nonlinear model does not exist. 
Thus, it is impossible to determine which model best depicts 
the process by which discounting proceeds. Perhaps in part 
because Shaver's model has been proposed more recently 
(1981) and waits to be tested empirically, Kelley's concepts 
of graded causes and effects typically are used to explain 
empirical evidence of discounting. Use of Kelley's theory 
to explain much of present empirical evidence, however,
15
cannot rule out the value of Shaver's theory as an 
alternative explanation for discounting practices.
An example of discounting explained with Kelley's 
causal .schema model is Cunningham and Kelley's (1975) study 
of attributions for "normal” and "extreme" outcomes. 
Hypothesizing that people use a multiple necessary causal 
schema to explain the occurrence of an event more often when 
the event in question is of great magnitude, the authors 
asked subjects for inferences of causes for interpersonal 
events and news stories of both ordinary and extreme 
magnitude. Subjects were asked to judge on a 7-point scale 
the extent to which each of several causes contributed to 
the event. The results appeared to support the authors' 
prediction that people switch from a multiple sufficient 
causal schema to a multiple necessary causal schema as the 
magnitude of an event increases, making attributions to more 
than one cause when the event in question is of great 
magnitude, but making attributions to only one of the 
possible causes when the event in question is a more 
"normal" moderate one.
This study suggested that subjects perceive at least 
two kinds of multiple necessary causal schemata, an emergent 
effects schema and a resultant effects schema. Emergent 
effects schemata have several causes that contribute in 
unique combination such that their effect is not simply the 
sum of the individual contributions (Kelley, 1972). In
16
contrast, resultant effect schemas describe results that are 
produced by the composite, or additive effect of two or more 
causes (Kelley, 1972). The additive schema is very similar 
to a multiple sufficient cause schema in that an effect will 
appear in the presence of either of the causes, as well as 
in the presence of both causes. This schema assumes that 
attributors not only determine whether an effect is present 
or absent, but also calculate the difference in strength of 
an effect produced by the additive effect of both causes, 
"EE,” and the strength of an effect produced by only one 
cause, ”E."
Although the results of this study suggested that 
subjects consider the strength or magnitude of an event when 
judging causality, and were able to conceptualize the 
effects of different combinations of causes, it did not 
provide conclusive evidence of linear discounting utilizing 
graded causes and effects. The results of this study could 
be used to defend Shaver's (1981) model of discrete causes 
if the results were discussed in terms of qualitative rather 
than quantitative differences. In other words, the effect 
“EE" could be described as qualitatively different than the 
effect "E," rather than simply a difference in strength. To 
determine which model best described the discounting process 
Cunningham and Kelley found, a more quantitative study would 
be needed.
17
Anderson's information integration theory (1974) 
perhaps presents the most conclusive evidence that 
attributors discount by grading both causes and effects.
His quantitative analysis of Kelley's (1973) discounting and 
augmentation principles indicated that subjects' perceptions 
of the strength of a second causal factor were altered in 
order to compensate for changes in the strength of the first 
causal factor. Furthermore, Anderson's analysis of data 
from Jones, Davis, and Gergen (1961) provided quantitative 
evidence for an additive model of graded causal factors.
This reanalysis failed to reveal a significant interaction 
between the two causal factors, suggesting that attributors 
recognized variations in the strength of effects as well as 
causes in such a way that the sum of the attributed causal 
strengths continued to equal the strength of the effect.
Anderson (1974) concluded that subjects used an 
averaging model more often than a simple additive model. 
These averaging models are similar to additive models, but 
use the concept of weight as well as scale values. 
Non-parallelism of attributed values confirms that the 
weight of the scaled values is increased as a function of 
perceived increases in the magnitude of an effect. Plotting 
data from Anderson and Butzin's (1974) study of judgments of 
performance, motivation, and ability, Anderson found a 
bilinear fan shape, illustrating use of a multiplicative 
model. This pattern of non-parallelism suggests that
18
perceivers can attribute greater strength to causal forces 
in such a manner that the product of the causal strength 
continues to equal the strength of the effect, even as the 
magnitude of the effect increases.
Despite the numerous studies that have found evidence 
for high ambiguity regarding the presence of additional 
causes when one cause sufficient to produce an effect is 
known to be present, some studies have failed to show that 
perceivers employ the discounting principle. Not finding 
evidence that perceivers experienced ambiguity regarding the 
possible presence of a second cause, Kun, Murray, and Sredl 
(1980) concluded that attributors use a variant-effects 
schema rather than the multiple sufficient schema proposed 
by Kelley (1972). Based on their empirical findings, the 
authors concluded that perceivers compare the strength of 
the presented effect to the strength of a given cause. In 
contrast to the graded-effects schema that states that the 
presence or absence of a second cause will be perceived 
equally probable in any instance where an event is produced 
in the presence of a sufficient cause, the variant-effects 
schema hypothesizes that the attributor will infer that a 
second cause is not present if the strength of the first 
cause matches the strength of the event. If, however, the 
strength of the cause does not match the strength of the 
event, the variant-effects schema hypothesizes that the 
attributor will assume that a second cause was present.
19
Because the attribution is made by comparing the strength of 
the cause to the strength of the event, ambiguity regarding 
the possible presence of multiple causes is minimized. 
Although this study did not support Kelley's ambiguity 
hypothesis, it nonetheless suggests both that subjects are 
sensitive to discrepancies between the strength of a cause 
and the magnitude of an event and that judgments involve 
consideration of quantitative differences in the strength of 
both causes and events.
Several other studies suggest that perceivers tend to 
ignore completely the possible contribution of a second 
causal factor when another sufficient cause is present 
(Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982; Smith, 1975). The minimum 
causation model of Shaklee and Fischhoff (1982) represents 
an attempt to explain this observed failure to discount.
This model claims that attributors tend to be "lazy", 
ignoring possible contributions of additional causes once a 
single cause is found to be sufficient. Shaklee and 
Fischhoff's minimum causation model suggests that people 
conduct a truncated serial search for information to help in 
making cause-effect inferences. According to Shaklee and 
Fischhoff, pertinent information about one possible cause is 
gathered before information is sought regarding other 
potential causes. Once a cause has been found to explain 
adequately the described event, the perceiver is thought to 
abandon the search for information regarding other potential
20
causes. Although this truncated search provides a 
simplified attribution process, it also provides substantial 
potential for mistaken attributional judgments. If the 
perceiver correctly identifies the single cause of an 
effect, this strategy works well. If, however, the 
perceiver identifies an incorrect cause, this strategy does 
not allow the gathering of information about other possible 
causes that would allow the perceiver to recognize the 
error. Additionally, in the many instances of multiple 
causes, the utilization of this strategy would lead to 
incomplete attributions. Without the identification of all 
contributing forces, prediction and control of future events 
is lessened.
In summary, numerous studies suggest that attributors 
discount the importance of multiple causal elements in some 
fashion. Without direct comparison of Kelley's linear model 
with Shaver's nonlinear model, however, it is impossible to 
determine whether discounting proceeds in a linear or 
nonlinear fashion. To add to the mystery of discounting are 
the several studies that have failed to find evidence of any 
type of discounting (Pryor & Kriss, 1977; Shaklee & 
Fischhoff, 1982; Smith & Miller, 1979). These conflicting 
results provide evidence of the difficulty inherent in 
testing the discounting principle empirically (Shaver,
1981).
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The primary purpose of this study was to determine 
whether discounting of probability and strength would 
support Shaklee and Fischhoff's (1982) minimum causation 
model, Kelley's graded causes model (1972), or Shaver's 
multiple discrete cause model (1981). Using trend component 
analysis, probability and strength judgments were evaluated 
for cause-event relationships with one, two, and three 
causes. Failure to find evidence of either linear or 
quadratic discounting would support the minimum causation 
model (Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982), whereas a linear function 
of discounting would support Kelley's causal schema model. 
The presence of both linear and quadratic functions would 
support Shaver's multiple discrete cause approach, 
suggesting that subjects consider both nonredundant and 
redundant causal subsets when discounting.
A second purpose of this study was to determine the 
extent to which judgments regarding the presence or absence 
of possible causes of a given event were transitive with 
judgments regarding the presence or absence of events given 
a particular set of causes. Typical attribution research 
presents subjects with an effect and asks for judgments 
regarding the importance or probable presence of a proposed 
cause or number of causes in the production of that effect. 
Because researchers assume that subjects accept the 
presented effect without question and concentrate solely on 
determining the causal elements and the strength of each,
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rarely have studies presented causal elements as "givens" 
and asked subjects to indicate their judgments of the 
likelihood that the proposed event followed.
Yet, outside the social psychology laboratory, it is 
not difficult to imagine the presence of potential causes 
intended to produce a particular effect that fail to produce 
this effect. Consider, for example, a situation in which A 
fires a gun at B. Although the causal shot is fired, unless 
A is an excellent marksman, there is a significant 
probability that the event, injury to B, will not result. 
Whether the event occurs or not will affect the magnitude of 
perceiver's response to the perpetrator and the legal 
charges brought against him or her. Although this example 
clearly indicates that the presence of a potential cause may 
not lead to the production of the intended event, the 
psychological study of causality makes the assumption that 
the average attributor takes for granted the presence of the 
typical effect when asked to evaluate the consequences of a 
particular set of causes. Without testing the' transitivity 
of discounting practices, it is impossible to determine 
whether this assumption is correct, or if attribution 
studies are hampered by a high level of artificiality.
On the other hand, nontransitivity of discounting might 
occur because particular causes are likely to produce a 
limited number of events, whereas events can often be 
produced by more numerous causes. This might lead
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individuals to judge the probability of an event occurring 
in the presence of a set of causes to be greater than the 
probability that any one set of causes was responsible for a 
particular event.
Nontransitive results might suggest that different 
discounting models account for assessment of strength and 
probability in the two directions. Whereas the minimum 
causation model (Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982) suggests that 
additional causal factors would not be considered once a 
single factor was determined adequate, both the causal 
schema model (Kelley, 1972) and the multiple discrete model 
(Shaver, 1981) assume that attributional judgments often 
involve multiple causal forces. According to Kelley's 
(1972) causal schema model, the overall probability of an 
event increases with the addition of causal elements because 
the addition of causal elements would lower the strength of 
other causes necessary for the production of an event. 
According to Shaver (1981), the introduction of additional 
causes increases the probability of an event because the 
additional causes increase the number of combinations of 
causes that could lead to the event. According to Shaver's 
model, the perceived likelihood of an event should increase 
more rapidly because perceivers evaluate both the redundant 
and nonredundant combinations of causes.
Finally, this study addressed the question of whether 
or not peoples' attributions differ depending on the
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situation in question. Because the consequences of legal 
attributions are often more binding and serious, it is 
possible that more thorough, thoughtful attributional 
searches are made for legal situations than for 
interpersonal situations. It is also possible that the 
relatively rare occurrence of legal attributions would 
result in attributions that would be more simple and naive 
than attributions for interpersonal situations. Although 
there is little research comparing discounting attributions 
for different types of situations, a study of the tendency 
to make dispositional and situational attributions (Allen, 
1985) showed significant differences in attributions for 
different situations. When asked to make trait attributions 
for interpersonal (date, concert, assignment) and legal 
situations (traffic ticket), trait attributions were higher 
for the majority of the interpersonal situations than they 
were for the legal situation.
The following hypotheses were made:
1. Nontransitivity of discounting was predicted such 
that subjects would disregard multiple causes when one cause 
was found to be sufficient in the events-qiven condition, 
whereas subjects in the causes-given condition would 
consider each additional cause, increasing the perceived 
probability that the event occurred as the number of causes 
increased. In other words, it was hypothesized that Shaklee 
& Fischhoff's minimum causation model (1982) would be
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employed when events were presented and subjects were asked 
to determine the importance of individual causes, whereas it 
was predicted that discounting would be evident when causes 
were presented and events predicted. Thus, when causes were 
presented, a main effect was predicted for number of causes, 
such that as the number of causal elements increased, the 
perceived likelihood of the event occurring would increase 
significantly. As stated earlier, discounting could show 
evidence of either linear or non-linear changes as the 
number of causes increased. If the pattern of discounting 
was linear, Kelley's causal schema model would be supported, 
whereas more rapid, nonlinear discounting would provide 
support for Shaver's multiple discrete schema model.
2. Because the number of causes that can produce a 
given effect typically is greater than the number of events 
that can be produced by a particular cause or set of causes, 
a significant main effect for experimental condition was 
predicted such that the perceived probability that a set of 
causal elements contributed to a given event was predicted 
to be less than the perceived probability that a particular 
event followed from given causal elements.
3. Attributions for legal situations were predicted to 
follow simpler rules of discounting than interpersonal 
situations because legal and interpersonal attributions 
differ on several dimensions. First, legal situations 
usually involve attributions made to a single human factor,
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with attributions to additional or intervening causes 
playing relatively minor roles in judgments. Thus, it was 
predicted that subjects would be more likely to ignore the 
influence of additional causes once a single cause was found 
sufficient to explain a particular event in legal situations 
than in interpersonal situations. Additionally, these two 
types of attributions are likely to differ because legal 
attributions are not as common as interpersonal 
attributions. Lack of familiarity with legal attributions 
was predicted to lead to reliance on simpler attribution 
rules whereby the contribution of more than one potential 
cause would be ignored when a single cause was found 
sufficient to produce the event. Thus, a significant 
Situation by Number of Causes interaction was predicted such 
that subjects would employ the minimum causation model 
(Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982) more consistently in legal 
situations than in interpersonal situations.
Method
Subjects
In the main study, 65 male and 84 female undergraduates 
participated in partial fulfillment of a research course 
requirement. Nineteen male and 20 female undergraduates 
participated in pretesting of the stimulus materials. All 
subjects were told that they were participating in a study 
of causal relationships and were assigned randomly to the 
experimental conditions.
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Materials
Pretesting was conducted on 10 legal and 10 
interpersonal situations used in previous attribution 
studies conducted by Cunningham and Kelley (1975), Major 
(1980), McArthur (1972), Schustack and Sternberg (1981) and 
Shaklee and Fischhoff (1982) as well as situations created 
by the author. The six interpersonal and six legal 
situations chosen for the main study were those found to 
have the fewest additional causes and events judged possible 
from the cause/event relationship and the fewest number of 
mediating factors thought needed for the event to occur.
For both legal and interpersonal situations, two situations 
were presented with one, two, and three causes. In both the 
events given and the causes given conditions, the number of 
causes as well as the specific causes remained constant for 
each cause-event association.
Pretesting
Groups of 9 or 10 students evaluated 10 legal and 10 
interpersonal situations with three causes on one of four 
dimensions during pretesting. In each of the four 
pretesting sessions, subjects evaluated the same 20 events 
and the same three causes associated with the events. The 
purpose of these pretests was to identify six situations of 
each type perceived to have the fewest number of mediating 
causes, the fewest number of unsolicited effects and the
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fewest number of prompted and unprompted causal attributions 
differing from those causes presented with the event.
The first pretesting measured the assumed causal 
proximity of the presented causes to the events. Ten 
subjects were presented with the 2 0 situations and the 
associated 1, 2, or 3 causes. The subjects were asked to 
list "any mediating forces that would have to occur between 
the listed cause or causes and the final event". This 
pretesting excluded use of cause-event situations judged to 
have more than two intervening causes.
The second pretesting evaluated the number of effects 
subjects believed possible from the presence of the 
presented cause or causes. Ten subjects were presented with 
the three causes associated with the above situations. The 
effects, however, were not presented to the subjects. The 
subjects were then asked to "list all events that could 
occur in the presence of the cause or causes listed". The 
purpose of this pretesting was to compare events listed by 
the subjects with the events associated with the cause-event 
situations. This pretesting identified situations with two 
characteristics. First, in comparison to the other 
situations pretested, the particular event associated with 
the cause-event pairing was more frequently listed by 
subjects as leading to the event. Second, given the listed 
causal factors, few alternative events were though to be 
possible.
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The third and fourth pretestings evaluated the numbers 
of causal attributions made for presented effects. The 
third pretesting presented the subjects with the 2 0 events 
without the corresponding causes. The 10 subjects were 
asked to "list all causes that would lead to the event".
This pretesting identified situations with two 
characteristics. First, this pretesting identified 
situations in which the associated causes were most often 
thought to be responsible for the presented event. 
Additionally, cause-event situations with the least number 
of causes not associated with the stimulus cause-event 
situation were identified. In the fourth pretesting, nine 
subjects were presented with both the event and the three 
causes associated with the event. Subjects were asked to 
"list any other causes that could lead to the presented 
event". The purpose of this pretesting was to identify the 
cause-event situations with few potential causes differing 
from those listed.
From the results of the pretesting, six interpersonal 
and six legal situations were chosen for the main study.
The number of causes associated with each situation was 
determined through the pretesting. The events associated 
with the fewest causes in pretesting became the "one-cause" 
situations in the main study. For these cause-event 
associations, the cause most often cited during pretesting 
was used as the one cause to be presented to subjects in the
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main study. The events associated with the next fewest 
causes became the "two-cause" situations in the study.
Again, the two causes most often cited during pretesting as 
causes likely to lead to the effect were used as the two 
causes to be presented to subjects in the main study. For 
the three-cause situations, the three causes presented 
during pretesting were used during the main study. The 
pairing of causes and situations remained constant across 
conditions.
Procedure
Sixty-five males and 84 females undergraduates 
participated in the main study. Subjects participated in 
groups ranging in size from 16 to 26. In both the 
events-given and the causes-given conditions, subjects were 
informed that they were taking part in a study of causal 
relationships and were presented six legal and six 
interpersonal situations. For both interpersonal and legal 
situations, two situations were presented with one cause, 
two with two causes, and two with three causes. To 
determine whether discounting involved reductions in the 
strength of each presented cause and event as well as the 
probability of presence, subjects were asked to consider 
changes in both strength and probability.
For each situation in the events-given condition, 
subjects were given an event and one, two, or three possible 
causes. Subjects were asked to determine how probable it
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was that each cause contributed to the production of the 
event independently of the other causes. Probability was 
measured on a 10-point scale with 1 meaning Not at all 
Probable and 10 meaning Very Probable. Subjects were then 
asked to assume that the causes were present and were asked 
to determine the strength of each cause independent of the 
other causes on a 7-point scale with endpoints labeled Not 
at all Important and Very Important.
In the causes-given condition, subjects were presented 
with one, two, or three causes and asked to determine the 
probability that a particular event resulted from the 
presence of the cause or causes. Probability was again 
measured on a 10-point scale with 1 meaning Not at all 
Probable and 10 meaning Very Probable. Subjects were then 
instructed to assume that the event actually did occur and 
were asked to estimate the strength of the event on a 
7-point scale with endpoints labeled Not at all Strong and 
Very Strong.
At the end of each experimental session, subjects were 
told that the research was studying the influence of 
multiple causes on inferences regarding both the probability 
and strength of events and causes in particular cause-event 
situations. Subjects were thanked for their participation 
and were offered an opportunity to receive the final results 
of the study.
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Results
In the events-given condition, subjects were given two 
legal and two interpersonal situations with one, two, and 
three possible causes each. Asked to estimate the 
probability and importance of each cause, subjects were 
instructed to consider each cause separately regardless of 
the number of potential causes presented. In the 
causes-given condition, subjects considered the same set of 
six legal and six interpersonal situations. In this 
condition, however, the cause or causes were presented as a 
group and the subject was asked to determine the likelihood 
that the proposed event did occur, and the strength of the 
occurrence given the cause or group of causes. In this 
experimental condition, the one, two, or three causes were 
considered as a group whereas in the events-given condition, 
the probability and strength of each causes was estimated 
separately. Because of this difference between conditions, 
discounting processes in the multiple cause situations were 
analyzed separately by condition. In the events-given 
condition, probabilities assigned to each of the causes in 
the two and three potential cause situations were averaged 
for each situation for the purpose of analysis.
Probability Estimates
Events-Given Condition. It was predicted that 
additional causes in the events-given condition would be 
disregarded when one cause was found to be sufficient for
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the production of the event. Thus, discounting was not 
predicted to occur and subjects were predicted to use 
Shaklee and Fischhoff's (1982) minimum causation model. A 2 
x 3 (Situation Type x Number of Causes) analysis of variance 
with repeated measures on the number of causes variable 
revealed a significant interaction, F (1, 68) = 4.84, p <  
.01, suggesting that discounting proceeds differently for 
different types of situations. Trend component analysis 
conducted on the data revealed a significant quadratic 
component for the interaction term, F (1, 68) = 10.58, p < 
.01. Contrary to predictions, mean probability ratings for 
legal situations indicated that subjects perceived the 
probability that any particular cause was present to be 
reduced as the number of causes increased from one (M =
6.69) to two (M = 6.08) to three causes (M = 5.29). For 
interpersonal situations, perceived probability also dropped 
significantly as the number of potential causes increased 
from one (M = 7.72) to three (M = 6.42). The similar mean 
probability rating for the two cause (M = 6.52) and the 
three cause interpersonal situations (M = 6.42) indicate 
that the amount of discounting for interpersonal situations 
did not differ as a function of the number of additional 
causes presented.
Insert Table 1 about here
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Causes-Given Condition. In the causes-given condition, 
it was predicted that estimates of the probability of an 
event occurring would increase as the number of presented 
causes increased. Thus, it was predicted that subjects 
would use either Kelley's (1972) causal schema model or 
Shaver's (1981) multiple discrete cause approach when 
evaluating the probability of an event when given one, two, 
or three causes. Additionally, it was predicted that 
probability estimates would show a less rapid increase for 
legal situations than for interpersonal situations. A 2 x 3 
(Situation Type x Number of Causes) analysis of variance 
with repeated measures on the number of causes variable 
revealed a significant interaction term, F (2, 150) = 12.85, 
p < .001. Trend component analysis revealed a significant 
linear component for the interaction term, F (1, 75) =
18.58, p < .001. Unlike discounting in the events-given 
condition, however, discounting in the causes-given 
condition did not show a significant quadratic component, 
indicating that the nature of the discounting function 
differed depending on the direction of the attribution. 
Inspection of the means in Table 1 suggests that people 
estimated an event to be more likely as the number of causal 
elements increased for interpersonal events, but not for 
legal events. Mean probability ratings for interpersonal 
situations revealed probability increases when the number of 
presented causes increased from one cause (M = 7.03) to two
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causes (M = 8.15) to three causes (M = 8.82). For legal 
situations, mean probability ratings remained fairly stable 
as the number of presented causes increased from one (M = 
6.68) to two (M = 6.76) to three (M = 6.90).
Strength Estimates
Predictions for the strength dependent variable were 
similar to the predictions for the probability dependent 
variable. To test these predictions, 2 x 3  (Situation x 
Number of Causes) analyses of variance with repeated 
measures on the number of causes variable were conducted on 
the dependent measure of strength for both the causes-given 
and the events-given conditions.
Events-Given Condition. In the events-given condition, 
the results did not confirm the prediction of the minimum 
causation model for either legal or interpersonal 
situations. The analysis of variance revealed a significant 
main effect for number of causes, F (1, 68) =67.53, p < 
.001. Unlike discounting of probability, discounting of 
strength showed no significant Situation x Type interaction 
term. Trend component analysis revealed a significant 
quadratic component, F (1, 68) =4.88, p < .05. As the 
means listed in Table 2 indicate, mean importance ratings 
for causes decreased for legal situations as the number of 
proposed causes increased from one (M = 6.24) to two (M = 
5.60) to three (M = 5.28). For interpersonal situations, 
mean importance ratings for the causes decreased in a
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similar pattern as the number of causes increased from one 
(M = 6.35) to two (M = 5.72) to three (M = 5.35).
Insert Table 2 about here
Causes-Given Condition. The analysis of variance 
revealed a significant interaction term for event strength,
F (2, 150) = 9.62, p < .001. A significant linear component 
in the trend component analysis suggests that the changes in 
the estimates of event strength occurred linearly, F (1, 75) 
= 14.09, p < .001. Listed in Table 2, the mean ratings for 
event strength in the causes-given condition suggest that 
people use different rules for making judgments in legal and 
interpersonal situations. For interpersonal situations, 
mean event strength ratings increased as the number of 
causes increased from one (M - 4.78) to two (M = 4.76) to 
three (M = 4.97). In contrast, however, judgments of event 
strength in legal situations actually decreased as the 
number of causes increased from one (M = 5.97) to two _(M = 
5.66) to three (M = 5.22).
Test of Transitivity for One-Cause Situations
Because particular causes are likely to produce a 
limited number of events, whereas events can often be 
produced by countless causes, non-transitivity of 
discounting was predicted such that probability and strength 
judgments would be greater for the causes-given condition
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when probability and strength of an event were judged than 
for the events-given condition where subjects judged the 
probability and strength of proposed causes. To determine 
whether attributions made in the causes-given condition 
matched attributions made in the events-given condition, 2 x 
2 (Situation x Attribution Direction) analyses of variance 
were conducted for both strength and probability dependent 
variables for one-cause situations.
Probability. The analysis of variance conducted on the 
dependent variable of probability revealed a significant 
Situation by Attribution Direction interaction, F (1, 143) = 
4.54, p < .05. Non-transitivity was obtained, although the 
pattern of differences was opposite to the predicted 
pattern. As listed in Table 3, the mean probability rating 
for interpersonal situations in the causes-given condition 
(M = 7.03) was lower than the mean probability rating in the 
events-given condition (M = 7.72), indicating that the 
proposed cause was judged more probable than the 
corresponding event. Mean probability ratings did not 
differ between the causes-given condition (M = 6.68) and the 
events-given condition (M = 6.69) for legal situations, 
suggesting that subjects judged the proposed cause equally 
probable as its corresponding event.
Insert Table 3 about here
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Strength. The analysis of variance on the dependent 
variable of strength revealed a significant Situation by 
Attribution Direction interaction, F (1, 143) = 35.94, p <  
.001. Mean strength ratings for interpersonal situations 
were also lower in the causes-given condition (M = 4.78) 
than in the events-given condition (M = 6.35). Unlike mean 
probability ratings, however, this trend was also seen in 
the mean strength ratings for legal situation in the 
causes-given condition (M = 5.97) and in the events-given 
condition (M = 6.24). Thus, subjects judged the importance 
of a cause to be greater than the strength of the 
corresponding event.
Storv Effects
Before concluding that different discounting processes 
explain attributional judgments in different types of 
situations, it is important to determine whether or not the 
different situations used to represent the two different 
types of situations, interpersonal and legal, were treated 
similarly by subjects. To determine whether or not subjects 
appeared to use the same discounting rules for the various 
situations within the categories of legal and interpersonal 
situations, one of the two situations with each of one, two, 
and three causes within each category was assigned randomly 
to one of two groups, Group A or Group B. Discounting 
across these two sets of three situations was analyzed using 
a 2 x 3 (Group X Number of Causes) ANOVA conducted
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separately for legal and interpersonal situations. 
Significant interaction effects were found for both 
interpersonal situations, F (2, 136) =4.84, p =  .009, and 
legal situations, F (2, 136) = 4.92, p =  .009. As Table 4 
indicates, the amount of decrease in subjects' mean 
probability ratings appears to be more dependent on the 
particular situation, and perhaps the particular set of 
causes under evaluation, than the number of possible causes 
presented.
Insert Table 4 about here
Examination of the pattern of probability estimates 
across causes in each situation with multiple causes would 
provide information regarding the role of presentation order 
in probability judgments. Separate ANOVAs were conducted 
for two and three cause situations of each situation type. 
Comparison of probability judgments across the causes 
presented in multiple cause situations revealed significant 
interactions for interpersonal situations with three causes, 
F (2, 136) = 67.48, p < .001, and for both three cause legal 
situations, F (2, 136) = 69.96, p < .001, and two cause 
legal situations, F (1, 68) =36.67, p < .001. The pattern 
of means listed in Table 5 suggests that subjects' 
probability judgments are based primarily on the
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plausibility of individual causes rather than the order of 
presentation.
Discussion
The results of this study suggest that subjects do not 
make identical attributions when given an event and asked to 
judge the probability or strength of a cause or causes as 
they do when given a cause or causes and asked to judge the 
probability or strength of a subsequent event. Interaction 
terms between legal and interpersonal events in both 
directions suggest at first glance that discounting 
practices differ depending on whether interpersonal or legal 
situations are under consideration. Further analysis, 
however, indicates that subjects may be using different 
discounting procedures depending on the particular situation 
under evaluation rather than the category of situation. The 
different conclusions that can be drawn depending on whether 
the results of this study are analyzed according to category 
of attributional task or according to individual situation 
are testament both to the difficulty inherent in studying 
discounting and the need to develop a typology of situations 
that might provide insight into the meaningful conceptual 
distinctions between situations. To evaluate the extent to 
which conclusions would differ depending on whether 
situations were grouped or whether situations were analyzed 
separately, the conclusions that could be drawn using each 
method of analysis will be compared.
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Legal versus Interpersonal Categorization of Situations 
When an event is given and subjects are asked to 
determine the likelihood that a cause or each of a number of 
causes contributed to the event, discounting occurs in a 
linear pattern for legal situations and a non-linear pattern 
for interpersonal situations. Thus, it appears that 
Kelley's causal schema model of linear discounting is used 
when judging legal situations. Depending on whether the 
slope changed more or less rapidly as the number of 
presented causes increased, the non-linear pattern of 
discounting observed in interpersonal situations could 
indicate utilization of either Shaver's multiple discrete 
cause approach or Shaklee and Fischhoff's minimum causation 
model. If the slope of the discounting function increased 
as the number of causes increased, it would suggest that 
subjects were using Shaver's multiple discrete cause model, 
considering individual causes as well as combinations of 
causes. Examination of the results indicate that the amount 
of discounting was equivalent for two and three cause 
situations. Thus, although subjects' predictions for events 
with one cause differed from events with more than one 
cause, predictions for events with two causes were similar 
to those with three causes. Because subjects discounted as 
much for one additional cause as for two additional causes, 
it appears that Shaklee and Fischhoff's (1982) minimum 
causation model predicts discounting in interpersonal
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situations when subjects are given an event and asked to 
determine the likelihood that a cause or each of a number of 
causes contributed to the event.
When presented with one, two, or three causes and asked 
to predict the likelihood of a particular event occurring, 
subjects appear to use Kelley's (1972) causal schema model 
of linear discounting for interpersonal situations. This 
linear function suggests that subjects consider each 
additional cause presented, but not all possible 
combinations of causes as would be predicted by Shaver's 
model. For legal situations, it appears that subjects used 
a minimum causation model when judging the likelihood of a 
legal event. This model states that people disregard the 
possible contribution of additional causes when a single 
cause has been found sufficient to produce an event.
When asked to estimate the strength of a cause or each 
of a number of causes that were responsible for the 
production of a given event, the mean strength estimated 
decreased in a nonlinear manner. Unlike probability 
estimates, strength estimates did not differ between legal 
and interpersonal situations in the events-given condition.
When given a cause or causes and asked to determine the 
strength of the resulting event, subjects' answers were 
somewhat surprising. Whereas estimates for interpersonal 
situations remained fairly level, estimated event strength 
for legal situations actually decreased as additional causes
43
were presented. This result appears counterintuitive; it 
would be expected that the strength of an event would either 
increase with the contribution of additional causes, or 
perhaps stay stationary if the contribution of additional 
causal forces was perceived to be superfluous to the 
production of an event. It is possible that subjects were 
confused when asked to judge the strength of an event. 
Whereas people frequently consider the strength of a cause 
and the relationship between the strength of a cause and the 
production of an event, it may be less common for people to 
assess the actual strength of an event. Instead of thinking 
in terms of event strength, people often register only 
whether an event occurred or not. The unfamiliarity of the 
concept of "event strength" was made evident by the number 
of subjects who asked the experimenter to define the term.
Focusing on one-cause situations, comparison of 
probability and strength attributions across the different 
attribution directions for both legal and interpersonal 
situations provides direct evidence that attributions are 
not always made transitively. The results of these 
comparisons indicate that both probability and strength 
estimates differed between the causes-given condition and 
the events-given condition for interpersonal situations. 
Judgments of interpersonal situations indicate higher 
estimates of probability and strength of causes when the 
event is given and probability or strength of possible
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causes is measured than when a cause is given and subjects 
are asked to judge the probability and strength of an event. 
In contrast, legal situations were attributed similar 
probability and strength regardless of the direction of the 
attribution. Although strength inferences follow a pattern 
similar to the pattern of probability inferences, one must 
be cautious in interpreting the strength estimates because 
many subjects appeared confused regarding the term "event 
strength."
Discounting Within the Legal and Interpersonal Domains
Although categorization of the situations used in this 
study into legal and interpersonal situations reveals a 
complex pattern of attributions, the pattern of results 
appears even more complex when attributions are analyzed for 
each situation separately. Clearly, the form of the 
discounting function used is not dependent on the domain of 
the situation in question. Perhaps familiarity with 
particular situations influences the attribution model used. 
Specifically, individuals may have developed more complete 
schemata for more frequently encountered or evaluated 
situations, allowing for more complex attributional 
decisions to be made for these situations. When asked to 
make judgments regarding less uncommon situations, the 
attributor may rely on less developed schema. As such, the 
attributor may be unable to consider the influence of more 
than one cause. It is likely that situations within both
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the legal and interpersonal domains vary in terms of 
familiarity. Alternatively, discounting may be the result 
of the use of cognitive heuristics such as salience, 
representativeness, or availability (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). 
These heuristics, involving differences in the ease of 
recall or the strength of association between a cause and an 
event, may influence the discounting process more than the 
number of causes presented.
Summary
Despite the confusing picture painted by these results, 
this study offers insight into the complexity of the 
attribution process and the inconsistent manner by which the 
naive attributor makes cause and event inferences. At 
times, the lay person appears to consider only one cause, 
whereas at other times he or she appears able to evaluate 
the possible contributions of additional causes. This study 
provides little evidence that subjects consider various 
combinations of potential causes.
These results suggest that no single discounting model 
can adequately describe the attribution process. Further 
research is needed to determine the limits of each model and 
to outline the circumstances under which each is used.
Failure to find transitivity of probability 
attributions points to a flaw in the assumptions inherent in 
most attribution research. Most studies present an event as 
a given, rather than as an uncertainty. When these studies
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conclude that subjects automatically discount causes when 
more than one cause is presented, possible changes in 
perceptions of the likelihood of the event occurring are not 
considered. Discounting implies that less additional 
information can be gathered by studying each successive 
additional cause. This is true if the probability of an 
event is assumed to be stable, but not if the likelihood of 
an event changes as new causes are added. It is quite 
probable that research supporting the discounting principle 
places structure on the attribution task that is not present 
in everyday attribution situations where event probability 
is considered.
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Table 1
Mean Probability Scores for One, Two, and Three Cause 
Situations For Events Given and Causes Given Legal and 
Interpersonal Situations
Condition
Number of Causes
One Two Three
Events-given
Legal M 6. 69 6.08 5.29
SD 1.44 1.33 1.25
Interpersonal M 7.72 6.51 6.42
SD 1.30 1.17 1.19
Causes-given
Legal M 6. 68 6.76 6.90
SD 1.81 1.60 2.11
Interpersonal M 7.03 8.15 8.82
SD 1.68 1. 35 1.47
Note. Probability measured on a 10 point scale.
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Table 2
Mean Strength Scores For One. Two, and Three Cause 
Situations For Events Given and Causes Given Legal and 
Interpersonal Situations
Condition
Number of Causes
One Two Three
Events-given
Legal M 6.24 5.60 5.28
SD 0.78 0.86 0.69
Interpersonal M 6.35 5.72 5.35
SD 0.61 0.68 0.80
Causes-given
Legal M 5.97 5.66 5.22
SD 0.86 0.80 1.20
Interpersonal M 4.78 4.76 4.97
SD 1.41 1.15 1.44
Note. Strength measured on a 7 point scale.
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Table 3
Mean Probability and Strength Estimates for One Cause Legal
and Interoersonal Situations 
Given Conditions
in Events Given and Causes
Condition
Dependent Measure Events- 
given
Causes-
given
Probability
Legal M 6.69 6. 68
SD 1.44 1.81
Interpersonal M 7.72 7.03
SD 1.30 1.68
Strength
Legal M 6.24 5.97
SD 0.78 0.86
Interpersonal M 6. 35 4.78
SD 0.61 1.41
Note. Probability was measured on a 10 point scale and 
strength was measured on a 7 point scale.
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Table 4
Mean Probability Ratings for Causes for Each of the Six 
Interpersonal and Six Legal Situations
Number of Causes
One Two Three
Interpersonal
Group A 8.00 6.52 6.93
Group B 7.45 6.51 5.92
Legal
Group A 7.10 5.93 5.11
Group B 6.28 6.24 5.47
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Table 5
Probability Estimates for Each Cause Presented in Multiole
Cause Situations as a Function of Presentation Order
Presentation Order
Condition First Second Third
Two Cause
Interpersonal
Situation A 
Situation B 
Legal
6.09
6.26
6.96
6.75
Situation A 
Situation B
Three Cause
5.87
7.07
6.61
4.78
Interpersonal
Situation A 
Situation B 
Legal
5.62
6.25
7.07
6.39
8.09 
5.13
Situation A 
Situation B
6.64
3.91
3.23
6.00
6.54
5.42
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Figure 1. Compensatory Schema for an Event with Two Causes
Cause 1 Cause 2
Absent Low Moderate High
__________ Strength______Strength____ Strength
Absent Effect Effect
Low
Strength
Effect Effect
Moderate
Strength
Effect Effect Effect Effect
High
Strength
Effect Effect Effect Effect
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